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Alleviating the Thucydides’ Trap through Welfare State Dependence: 
How the Funding Needs of the Western Welfare State Can Influence Multilateral Relations 
with China 
  
 Emilios Avgouleas*, Vasilis Trigkas** 
Abstract 
The dual threat of a US-China confrontation and the rise of populism in the West due, in part, to 
the gradual decay of the welfare state, paint an ominous picture for the future of the post-war status 
quo of ever-expanding prosperity. Hegemonic competition between the 
incumbent superpower (the USA) and the challenger (China) framed as the Thucydides’ Trap and 
adverse demographic and financial trends are the main causes behind both crises. In this paper we 
argue that amidst deteriorating demographics, the sustainability of the Western welfare state could 
be significantly enhanced by positioning Western institutional investments in the regions across 
India and South East Asia - areas with strong modernization dynamics and the world’s nascent 
most populous middle class. Such a policy could generate long-term higher risk-adjusted returns 
for Western pension funds, especially if Western investors look for complementarities with 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The proposed geographical calibration in Western 
institutional investments could lead to a relationship of strong reciprocal dependence between 
economic and social growth in the target regions, exports of Chinese construction and financial 
capacity, and Western welfare state viability. We call the suggested policy the “welfare state 
dependence” hypothesis. The key objective of the hypothesis is the promotion of peaceful 
economic and geo-political co-existence in Eurasia through rational re-alignment of the incentives 
of Western polities with Eurasian growth. But to make this new approach feasible a number of 
BRI policy reforms that supports its multilateralization are required. 	
 	
 	





1. A rational realignment of long-term interests and symmetric - reciprocal benefits between 
China and the West which places the funding of the Western welfare state at its centre has 
the potential to reverse heightened tensions between China and the West thus alleviating the 
Thucydides Trap. 
2. Strong modernization dynamics in the BRI region will create the most populous middle 
class in the world with bustling consumption demand. Therefore, shifting investible funds 
to the BRI region (particularly Indochina, Indonesia and the Subcontinent) means higher 
risk-adjusted returns. These would alleviate demographic pressures and low investment 
returns for Western pension funds thus ‘buying time’ for a sustainable reform of the Western 
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welfare state. A 1 per cent increase of returns for Western pension funds would decrease 
contributions by 10% providing vital fiscal space and buy political time for sustainable 
reform of fragile Welfare systems. 
3. Offering solid policies that can shift BRI’s focus from regional domination to a genuine 
partnership between Chinese (state) and private (Western) institutional investors based 
on world class soft - regulatory infrastructure. This partnership could also close the funding 
gap and augment debt and environmental sustainability approval tests for BRI projects. 
4. Upgrade and modernize the fiduciary framework of Western Institutional Investors to 
enable them to take long-term bets in emerging markets. Canada's CCPP could serve as an 
example of a safe shift of institutional assets towards Eurasia.  
5. Disincentivize a rollback 2.0 containment strategy and other forms of geopolitical 
confrontation which now extend to calls for a China-US financial war. 
6. A grand investment forum in Beijing engaging with Institutional Investors and the world’s 
development banks would offer a great opportunity to set networks of experts in place. This event 
could also provide an opportunity for China’s Development bank and China’s EXIM (state directed 
development banks) to join forces with Asian Infrastructure and Investment Bank eventually shifting 
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the gradual decay of the welfare state, paint an ominous picture for the future of the post-war status 
quo of ever-expanding prosperity. Hegemonic competition between the 
incumbent superpower (the USA) and the challenger (China) framed as the Thucydides’ Trap and 
adverse demographic and financial trends are the main causes behind both crises. In this paper we 
argue that amidst deteriorating demographics, the sustainability of the Western welfare state could 
be significantly enhanced by positioning Western institutional investments in the regions across 
India and South East Asia - areas with strong modernization dynamics and the world’s nascent 
most populous middle class. Such a policy could generate long-term higher risk-adjusted returns 
for Western pension funds, especially if Western investors look for complementarities with 
China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The proposed geographical calibration in Western 
institutional investments could lead to a relationship of strong reciprocaldependence between 
economic and social growth in the target regions, exports of Chinese construction and financial 
capacity, and Western welfare state viability. We call the suggested policy the “welfare state 
dependence” hypothesis. The key objective of the hypothesis is the promotion of peaceful 
economic and geo-political co-existence in Eurasia through rational re-alignment of the incentives 
of Western polities with Eurasian growth. But to make this new approach feasible a number of 
BRI policy reforms that supports its multilateralization are required. 	
 	
 	





1. A rational realignment of long-term interests and symmetric - reciprocal benefits between 
China and the West which places the funding of the Western welfare state at its centre has 
the potential to reverse heightened tensions between China and the West thus alleviating 
the Thucydides Trap. 
2. Strong modernization dynamics in the BRI region will create the most populous middle 
class in the world with bustling consumption demand. Therefore, shifting investible funds 
to the BRI region (particularly Indochina, Indonesia and the Subcontinent) means higher 
risk-adjusted returns. These would alleviate demographic pressures and low investment 
returns for Western pension funds thus ‘buying time’ for a sustainable reform of the 
Western welfare state. A 1 per cent increase of returns for Western pension funds would 
decrease contributions by 10% providing vital fiscal space and buy political time for 
sustainable reform of fragile Welfare systems. 
3. Offering solid policies that can shift BRI’s focus from regional domination to a genuine 
partnership between Chinese (state) and private (Western) institutional investors based 
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on world class soft - regulatory infrastructure. This partnership could also close the funding 
gap and augment debt and environmental sustainability approval tests for BRI projects. 
4. Upgrade and modernize the fiduciary framework of Western Institutional Investors to 
enable them to take long-term bets in emerging markets. Canada's CCPP could serve as 
an example of a safe shift of institutional assets towards Eurasia.  
5. Disincentivize a rollback 2.0 containment strategy and other forms of geopolitical 
confrontation which now extend to calls for a China-US financial war. 
6. A grand investment forum in Beijing engaging with Institutional Investors and the world’s 
development banks would offer a great opportunity to set  networks of experts in place. 
This event could also provide an opportunity for China’s Development bank and China’s 
EXIM (state directed development banks) to join forces with Asian Infrastructure and 
Investment Bankeventually shifting focus from bilateral to multilateral 
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The Geopolitical Crisis: Democratization Did Not Work	
 	
The economic and military rise of China has set geopolitical alarm bells in the West and 
especially in the USA, the world’s pre-eminent hegemon since 1989. This had been the case even 
before the Trump administration framed China as a ‘revisionist power’[1] (The White House, 2017) 
and took a more activist stance first to redress persistent trade imbalances, and second to delay 
China’s technological advancement[2]. Since trade, finance and technology have been the weapons 
of choice in the atomic epoch where a conventional military conflict between nuclear superpowers 
could escalate to Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) (Kahn, 1967; Schelling, 2008; Bracken, 
2012; Do Nuclear Weapons Matter? 2018), the intensification of geo-economic competition 
between the USA and China may eventually engulf most Western powers given their defense 
dependency on the USA. As a learned geopolitician once put it, the logic of conflict is being 
transplanted into the grammar of commerce (Luttwak, 1990) and a zero-sum game about market 
shares, technological breakthroughs and commercial fait accomplis may define the Sino-US 
strategic competition in the 21st century (Wright, 2017).	
The in-depth examination of the structural conditions that have provoked this 
intensification of Sino-US strategic rivalry has turned the Thucydides’ trap, which refers to the 
ominous dynamics between a rising power and a ruling power, into the central theoretical paradigm 
for explaining the relationship between the USA and China (Alisson, 2018). Even the Chinese 
President Xi Jinping has cited the famous geopolitical riddle first posited by the Athenian historian 
to explain the inevitability of the confrontation between Sparta and Athens. But Xi did so to negate 
its fatalistic outcome and explain it, instead, as a pivotal problem of ‘strategic miscalculation’ (Xi, 
2015). To neutralize the trap that in more recent times trapped in succession England and France, 
the British Empire and rising Germany, and the United States and Japan, a new stream of 
geopolitical thinking is required. This should cut across the teleology of ‘Democratic Peace’ or the 
dogmatism of free trade which has in reality been undermined by both the hegemonic and the 
contesting power.	
For decades, the orthodoxy within America’s strategic community, was that the most viable 
path towards peace with an ascending China would be ‘Kantian’; that is, liberal democracy would 
eventually conquer the heart and mind of the Middle Kingdom[3]. Inspired by a soft post-Tiananmen 
offensive, the United States during the Clinton era and under the influence of the Harvard 
professorial trinity of Joseph Nye, Kurt Campbell and Ezra Vogel, engaged China and facilitated 
its entry into the World Trade Organization (WTO) (Green, 2017, p. 457-473; Nye, 1995). The 
trinity postulated that international trade would eventually lead to cross-fertilization of governance 
ideas and practices. President Bill Clinton himself asserted that: ‘Without the full freedom to think, 
question, to create, China will be at a distinct disadvantage, competing with fully open societies 
in the information age where the greatest source of national welth is what resides in the human 
mind.’ (Campbell and Ratner, 2018). Gradually, as trade would enrich China, a new middle class 
would be formed which would bend the long arc of authoritarianism towards a managed form of 
democratic pluralism (Diamond & Myers, 2001; Lipset, 1959; 1963). 	
The key argument was that ultimately democracies rarely go to war with each other and, if 
they do, they promptly reconcile. And this approach was successful up to a point. Not only the US 
strategy of constructive engagement  or  ‘congagement’ (Zalmay, 1999; Zamayet al, 1999) lifted 
hundreds of millions of Chinese citizens out of poverty but it also tied China firmly in the chariot 
of globalization. And while the key beneficiary from this engagement was China the benefits were 
eventually spread more widely. In fact, in the period after the 2008 Global Financial Crisis, which 
was, in fact, an existential crisis of Western capitalism, China became the steam engine of global 
growth (Christensen, 2015, p. 190).	
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Yet, ultimately, the approach championed by the Harvard professorial trinity did not work. 
17 years since China’s entry into the WTO, Beijing has repudiated US style liberal democracy. 
China’s policy and ideological shift towards an assertive New Era (xinde dai 新时代) of semi-
autocratic rule with a distinctive identity of Sinicized Marxism (zhong guo tese shehui zhuyi 中国
特色社会主义) (Xi, 2017) has been the result of three factors. First, America’s 2003 decision to 
invade Iraq diverged strategic capital away from China and undermined the attraction of US’s 
global leadership. Second, the 2008 collapse of global financial markets in many ways discredited 
the model of neoliberal capitalism that is based on uncoordinated market forces. This came to be 
seen by CPC’s intellectuals as the source of unmitigated destruction. Third, Beijing’s 
economic and technological successes (see Huawei), in spite some colossal challenges (SOEs’ 
indebtedness and a shaky shadow banking sector) have inspired a new confidence in the hybrid 
Chinese model of central planning and market economics – officially framed as the socialist 
market.	
Meanwhile in the United States the triumphal euphoria of the 90’s about the liberal 
democratic telos of history has evaporated as it was largely usurped by oligarchic neoliberal elites. 
In the name of liberalism, plutocratic tax-evaders made their best to undermine liberalism’s very 
foundations by shifting the tax burden on the stagnant incomes of the middle class. Consequently, 
amidst ‘Gilded Age’ levels of inequality, demagogues rose into being a potent political force. Free 
trade and the US trade counterparts chiefly the PRC, the EU, Canada and Mexico have become 
the easy scapegoats for the forces of indignant populism. It has since not taken long for both the 
US congress and the executive to not only frame China as a trade threat but also keenly strategize 
on how to counter Beijing’s ascending global influence in a ‘whole of society approach’ (Sutter, 
2018).	
 It is realistic to assume that even when the toxic populist language in US foreign trade 
policy has been toned down the geopolitical rivalry with the PRC will remain and will eventually 
engulf the rest of the West, albeit in milder forms shaping mostly into a struggle for technological 
primacy and the case of Huawei is paradigmatic (Kaplan, 2019; Paulson 2018).	
In such a turbulent geopolitical context, we see the supply to Western polities of rational 
economic incentives as the key route to alleviate the trap and thus the argument we advance here 
is based on pure ‘realpolitik’ premises[4]. Western pension funds, based within and outside the 
USA, are faced today with the dual existential challenge of anemic long-term interest rates and 
sharply falling support ratios. Therefore, their inexorable search for active high-value added 
investing could be a catalyst for a re-alignment of Western and Chinese interests and act as a 
counterweight to the intensifying rivalry we observe today.	
Co-investment across the Indian and South East Asian region alongside the Chinese BRI 
can enhance the long-term viability of western pension funds. In addition, it can raise the costs of 
conflict and of a nascent geo-economic bifurcation to prohibitive levels leading to the devising of 
strategies of mutual engagement rather than mutual destruction in all scenarios averting or at least 
taming a new ‘Cold War’. Simply put, any increase of the stakes that Western pension funds and 
Chinese developmental funds have in the prosperity of the non-Western (and, conversely, the non-
Chinese economic sphere) could exert pressure on the American and the Chinese elites to refrain 
from proxy wars and	the	creation	of	exclusive	spheres of influence à la Cold War.	
Our focus on pension fund investment is not arbitrary theorization. As we live in the epoch 
of ‘money managers’ capitalism’ (Minsky 1990; 1993), the Bank of International Settlements 
(BIS) prophecy 20 years ago that ‘Institutional investors are a permanent feature of the financial 
landscape, and their growth will continue at a similar, and perhaps faster pace.’ is today’s reality 
(Bank for International Settlements, Annual Report, 1998, p. 95). 	
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 Institutional investors as the most long-term money managers and especially pension 
funds have already become pivotal players in international political economy. According to the 
World Economic Forum, institutional investors managed assets exceeded $50tn in 2015, compared 
to $30tn in 2007 – a sum higher than the combined GDP of China and the USA. Admittedly, an 
increasing proportion of household savings are managed today ‘by professional portfolio 
managers instead of being directly invested in the securities markets or held in the form of bank 
deposits’ (Davis and Steil, 2001). Institutional investors often participate in corporate decision 
making and manage assets which are central to the operation of the Welfare state, which explains 
the ever-growing size of their asset base. Just by a mere investigation of Institutional investor’s 
funding sources (pension funds, insurance and sovereign wealth funds), their unhindered operation 
is synonymous to the viability of the Western welfare state and as such they have become pivotal 
to the stability of social order across the world. [5]	
 	
The Welfare State Crisis	
 	
At the epicenter of the current welfare state crisis in the West is the inability of liberal 
republics to sustain rising welfare expenses as societies mature and demand higher benefits – a 
relationship captured in Wagner’s Law (Musgrave, 1973; Gilpin 1982, p164). Inversed population 
pyramids (Schwarz, 2014) and the consequent declining inversed dependency ratios also called 
support ratios (number of independent workers supporting a dependent person) have added 
dynamic complexity into welfare systems designed under a static hypothesis about economic 
fundamentals (demographics, discount rates and economic growth) and have thus significantly 
exacerbated the welfare crisis (Harper, 2014; European Central Bank, 2018.	
The Welfare state - an invention of the post-WWII baby boomers and early Generation-X 
era - has been built upon the premises of temporal economics with an underlying hypothesis of 
sufficient support and asset return ratios. Yet current demographic trends, turbulent markets 
and anemic growth in Total Factor Productivity (TFP) signal serious trouble ahead. According to 
the UN population database (medium variant population projection), by mid-century retirees (aged 
more than 65) will account for more than 40% of the working age population in most G7 nations 
with the ratio in Japan reaching 70% (United Nations, 2017). Meanwhile the adage about China 
has been that the country will grow old before growing rich and its support ratio will decline by 
more than 50% by mid-century. China’s support ratio will have by then become worse than that 
of the United States while Beijing will still be at an inferior per capital income level (Caixin, 2018).	
From all the macro-trends that economists usually take into consideration looking into the 
crystal ball, demographics tend to be among the most credible and thus the expectations about 
faltering support ratios could be taken as a key input to shape our understanding of a ‘pensions 
time bomb’. Not only pensions will be adversely affected by slow growth and ageing but also 
public finance as ‘higher age-related primary deficits are expected to contribute to higher 
government debt-to-GDP ratios.’ (European Central Bank, 2018).	
 To be sure, the impact of unhealthy demographic trends on Welfare and pensions could 
partly be addressed either by changing the macroeconomic conditions (increase productivity, raise 
the discount rate) or by a technocratic regulatory reform (raise retirement age, cut retirement 
benefits, increase migration). For instance, if TFP was to ascend strongly thus significantly 
boosting GDP growth in the West or if Western constituencies were to accept lower retirement 
benefits or retirement age was to become indexed to rising life expectancy then the crisis would 
not be as severe. In addition, a shift from defined benefit systems to defined contributions along 
with a mixed pay-as-you-go and funded approach would also help lessen the impact of ageing 
(Maestas, Mullen and Powell, 2016). 	
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Unfortunately, a high productivity scenario is highly unlikely and the term ‘secular 
stagnation’ has often been used to describe the limited conventional capacity of monetary and 
fiscal mechanisms in the West to boost productivity and achieve real GDP growth higher than 
3%[6]. In fact, as many investors have extrapolated past returns into the future - returns which were 
achieved at a time when growth was strong - their return projections may be overly optimistic 
(Saft2009). A rule of thumb is that a 1% decline in asset returns requires an extra 10% in annual 
funding just to break even. In addition, the technological explosion that is upon us via the 
4th industrial revolution and the expected widespread job losses across the spectrum (McKinsey 
Global Institute, 2017)[7], make an increase in annual funding highly unlikely. Therefore, with 
significantly lower returns than expected the pension time bomb may be ticking faster and most 
states lack the fiscal capacity to fill in the gap resulting from inferior investment returns.	
Furthermore, the high levels of inequality and political polarization make it increasingly 
difficult for politicians to legislate drastic welfare cuts or allow significant migratory inflows. As 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory suggests, individuals become rather attached to status 
quo and thus extremely adversarial when they lose benefits that have long been taken for granted. 
Then, while an increase of retirement age could alleviate a pressing crisis it cannot by itself keep 
the system alive in the long term. Increasing the retirement age may also be socially unfair. As 
Nobel Laureate economist Paul Krugman has put it, affluent and well-educated Americans have 
seen their life expectancy rising and thus could retire late but poor Americans have hardly seen 
any rise in life expectancy at 65 and in fact for some groups life expectancy has declined. Raising 
retirement age ‘amounts in effect, to the notion that we can’t let janitors retire because lawyers are 
living longer’ (Krugman, 2013). Hence a focus on increasing the real annual returns of pension 
funds could become the pivotal strategy to buy time and gain fiscal space for a fairer reform 
of Western pension and welfare state systems.	
The case of the US Social Security fund could be didactic and highlights the key tradeoffs. 
As Martin Feldstein put it:	
 	
since 2016, the benefit payments have exceeded the combination of the tax 
funds and the interest, causing the trust fund balance to decline. Looking 
ahead, the Social Security Administration’s actuaries estimate that the 
annual decline in the trust fund will continue, until the balance is zero in 
2034 (Feldstein, 2018a).	
 	
Feldstein argued that the tax hikes needed to replenish the trust fund were extremely 
expensive and thus politically hard to reach. He argued instead for the fund to shift from a passive 
investment strategy to active; from treasury bills to a mix of bonds and stocks. 	
 	
A typical US private pension has 60% of its assets in equities and the 
remaining 40% in high quality bonds, providing a real rate of return of about 
5.5% over long periods. In contrast, taxes collected for a PAYG system 
produce a real rate of return of about 2% without investing in financial 
assets, because real wages and the number of taxpayers rise.’ (Feldstein, 
2018a). 	
 	
To be sure, as the US trust fund would buy less treasury bills the cost of refinancing US 
debt would be subject to some market discipline but more demand for stocks would also raise the 
price of US stocks in terms of price to earnings and EBITDA. Thus, and this is one of the crucial 
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points, to achieve lower risk profiles, diversification in investments outside of the US would also 
be essential.	
A drive towards more active investing would alleviate a substantial part of the fiscal and 
political troubles of the West that are premised on projected pension fund shortfalls. Pension funds 
have not failed to observe the shock to their portfolios provoked by declining support ratios and 
slow GDP growth. According to CITIGPS estimates, ‘the total value of underfunded government 
pension liabilities for twenty OECD countries is a staggering $78 trillion, or almost double the 
$44 trillion published national debt number. (Citi GPS, 2016).	
 	
 	
The BRI Region: Higher-risk Adjusted Returns Could Buy Time for Sustainable Reform of 
Welfare Systems	
 	
To recuperate and preempt future disruption some of the world’s largest pension funds 
have already looked towards a more active approach for ‘added value’ thus investing an increasing 
share of their portfolios in emerging economies, particularly in South East Asia. Simply put, long-
term returns across Southeast Asia outrank returnin mature markets in Europe and North America 
offering intuitional investors ample opportunities to sustain long positions with higher risk-
adjusted returns. In a longer-term context, international investment in countries with a relatively 
young population may be essential to prevent battles over resources between workers and retirees 
in countries with an aging population’ (Blake, 1997). 	
Indeed, as an ECB report notices:	
 	
‘Several studies have found evidence of capital flows from “older” countries to countries 
with more favourable demographics. The downward pressure that ageing exerts on the 
labour force can be expected to reduce the price of capital relative to labour. Such capital 
deepening will exert downward pressure on returns to capital. However, in open 
economies with no capital controls, savings do not have to be invested domestically and 
can be absorbed by capital exports, which will reduce the pressure on domestic returns to 
capital.’ (ECB, 2018)	
 	
 The CPPIB - Canada’s leading pension fund with half a trillion Canadian dollars in assets, 
for instance, has already allocated 19% of its investment portfolio to Asia with China and India 
accounting for 40% (Wiseman and Kim, 2017). CPPIB is looking for new opportunities across 
Asia and expects its exposure to Asian markets to double by 2030. Similarly, Blackrock, the 
worlds’ largest asset manager with more than $6 trillion of managing assets, has also expanded its 
positions in Asia and now employs 2.500 officers in 25 offices across the region (Wiseman and 
Kim 2017). 	
 This number, however staggering, is not sufficient if one considers that China, the Indian 
Subcontinent, and ASEAN will account for more than 65% of the global population by mid-
century. Forecasts predict a 4 billion people-strong middle class in South and South East Asia with 
burgeoning consumption habits and growth in peak spender generations: millennials and post-
millennials. Thus provided that the region is stable and peaceful, the inevitable outcome will be 
rapid economic growth and sustained modernization dynamics. Hence, the potential of the region 
for active investment is tremendous[8]. In our view, there is, still, a key opportunity for the attraction 
of a larger pie of the Institutional investors’ assets to Eurasia (mostly subcontinent and ASEAN) 
particularly through a cooperative effort with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)[9]. 	
The BRI has often been framed as a ‘debt trap’ and certain projects within the initiative 
have indeed followed suboptimal fiduciary and governance standards. Overall however, the 
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ambition and financial pool of the BRI offers an attractive direction for investors particularly if 
Western and Chinese institutions engage in regulatory harmonization along with credible and 
impartial dispute resolution mechanisms. The long established expertise of Western institutional 
investors could be employed to optimize financial leverage and promote the development of soft 
infrastructure (standards and modes). With higher risk-adjusted returns springing from societies 
with younger populations and strong modernization dynamics, a partnership between Western 
institutional investors and BRI institutions could facilitate a new global social contract of peace 
and prosperity. More realistically, such partnership could complement the now faltering 
‘Democratic Peace Hypothesis’ with a ‘Welfare State Dependence Hypothesis’. The vibrancy of 
the Western welfare state will be, in part, dependent upon the outcome of a joint Sino-Western 
effort (BRI & institutional investors) to catalyze the economic development of Eurasia which 
could sufficiently boost financial returns to pension funds and mitigate the social pain and political 
upheaval resulting from a sharp decline in social benefits[10]. 	
According to a report by the Asian Development Bank (ADB), across Eurasia, 
infrastructure financing does not match the optimal funds needed based on the region’s population 
and macroeconomic fundamentals. Even the cumulative capital provided by the Asian 
Infrastructure & Investment Bank (AIIB), the World Bank, the European Investment Bank (EIB), 
the Asian Development Bank and other governmental or intergovernmental financial institutions 
does little to cover a financing deficit of about $459 billion per year (Ra and Li, 2018). In 
narrowing this deficit, the investment firepower of western Institutional investors is therefore 
essential. With long-term liabilities and a constant flow of subscription cash to cover immediate 
re-financing needs, pension funds in particular can afford adopting long-term investment horizons. 
Therefore, they can take investment positions in relatively illiquid assets thatprovide 
sufficient long-term returns to compensate for this illiquidity. Given the nature of 
their investment priorities: higher risk-adjusted returns in projects with longer maturities, pension 
funds could naturally complement BRI’s goal for infrastructure connectivity and Eurasian 
economic integration. Funding provided by development banks (AIIB or ADB for 
instance) syndicated with Institutional investors could offer high-risk-adjusted returns and help 
inspire a new international financial paradigm towards long-term financing and socially productive 
investments.	
Committing institutional investors’ funds and skills in this type of investment would also 
signal a broader (and very welcome) paradigm shift for the global investment community in 
accordance with the World Bank and UN pronouncements about the urgent need to shift financial 
market resources towards sustainable investment. Arguably, one of the key failures of the 
neoliberal economic model in the past 30 years has been its inability to promote long-term 
investments as key economic stakeholders focus on short-term speculation and neglect investments 
conducive to productivity and long-term infrastructure (Kay Review, 2012). The prevalence of this 
so-called ‘Quarterly Capitalism’ has created a large infrastructure investment gap and was one of 
the key reasons behind the 2008 great recession. As a learned economist put it reflecting on the 
theory of Hyman Minsky, 	
When the capital development of a country becomes the by-product of the 
activities of a casino, the job is likely to be ill-done. Thus, Government 
action—public policy—is the final key element in Minsky’s theory of 
capitalist economic development. Policy decisions shape the institutional 
framework that conditions economic activity’ (Whalen, 2012). 	
 	
To be sure, it has to be stressed that Institutional investors and pension funds will not shift 
funding to Eurasia and engage with the BRI philanthropically. Extra-financial reasons such as 
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China-US peaceful engagement or poverty alleviation unfortunately fall outside the fiduciary 
duties of money managers or pension funds. Thus we in our argument here frame the realistic and 
pressing need of those managers to look for higher risk-adjusted returns which are at the core of 
their operations. In the next section we highlight some necessary reforms in the BRI which could 
decrease regional risk, provide a more open and transparent regulatory environment and further 
motivate institutional investors to engage with the region. 	
 	
 	
Multilateralizing the BRI and Upgrading Soft Infrastructure	
 	
Human agency and creative leadership that can catalyze institutional reform will be a 
prerequisite to pave an attractive investment environment across the BRI. With a highly restrictive 
fiduciary responsibility to secure their assets first, institutional investors will not play politics 
unless there are clear-cut financial incentives mainly though the provision of optimal risk-adjusted 
returns. As one knowledgeable observer has put it, ‘the development of properly structured 
projects, with risks and returns distributed in accordance with stakeholders’ incentives is essential 
to attract infrastructure investment. Inadequate coverage of risks is one of the most common 
reasons projects do not reach financial close’ (Canuto, 2017).	
Furthermore, a complex and rigid regulatory environment across the BRI region and varied 
contractual structures demotivate investors.[11] China should therefore engage with key institutional 
players, for instance, along the lines of its paradigmatic memorandum with CPPIB, and design 
credible contractual structures for BRI infrastructure projects (Wiseman and Kim 2017). In the 
same context, China in partnership with BRI countries should double down on efforts to promote 
a regulatory framework which protects investors along the lines of World Bank’s ICSID or the 
New York Convention arbitration standards. Providing institutional investors with adequate 
protection from sovereign, political and country risk should be seen as a top priority 
for BRI’s soft – normative infrastructure. It is therefore a significant step to the right direction that 
in August 2018 China established its first international experts committee which aims ‘to ensure 
operation and promote adjudication of the International Commercial Court, and support to 
resolve international commercial disputes through arbitration, mediation, litigation and other 
diversified commercial dispute settlement methods. (China International Commercial Court, 
2018). 	
 On a more technical level, Chinese development banks could design insurance policies, 
operationalize projects bonds and advance other hedging mechanisms ingrained in key BRI 
initiatives. To match its commitment for an open BRI, China should also provide more openness 
for investors to acquire Chinese assets. The preference of institutional investors (particularly 
pension funds and insurances) towards projects with long-term maturity will not negatively affect 
China’s capital account– a key policy objective of the CPC. Thus the promotion of Bilateral 
Investments Treaties (BITs) with the EU and the U.S. should become a priority stressing Beijing’s 
commitment to financial openness.	
Chinese openness to institutional investors is one of the core prerequisites for facilitating 
the welfare state peace hypothesis. As Larry Summers has put it, secular stagnation with its glacial 
GDP expansion and anemic real interest rates in the West could be associated with declining real 
exchange rates in OECD economies and this would increase competitiveness and export demand 
only if capital was allowed to flow freely to emerging markets. Hence, if China retains its marked 
reluctance towards investment openness domestically or through draconian procurement 
restrictions along the BRI, this would hinder investment flows from the West. Chinese 
intransigence would offer additional fuel to populists in the West to frame China as a fundamental 
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economic and societal threat. This finding makes it all the more important for China 
to mulilateralize the BRI, complete bilateral investment agreements, and furher its cooperation 
with institutional investors.	
Furthermore, other infrastructure initiatives could augment the quality of public private 
partnerships across the spectrum of BRI projects and contain the risk of mutual cheating. A good 
example here is the building up of a market platform that will act as both a locus for raising BRI 
finance and the trade of stakes in various BRI projects or other forms of securitized debt using 
fully transparent Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT). Western institutional investor supply of 
liquidity will always gravitate towards the more transparent and best governed projects where due 
diligence can take place without state-imposed obstacles. (Avgouleas Kiayias 2019, 
Avgouleas2019b). This form of essential market infrastructure would create powerful incentives 
for all state and private sponsors of BRI projects to infuse a culture of openness, transparency and 
good governance in order to attract liquidity, gradually eliminating market of lemons types of 
problems, which are today rife in the context of BRI investment.	
A grand investment forum in Beijing engaging with institutional investors and the world’s 
development banks would offer a great opportunity to promote all these goals mentioned here 
simultaneously and set the networks of experts in place. The forum should explore best practices 
and build linkages between institutional investors and multilateral development banks. This event 
could also provide an opportunity for China’s Development bank and China’s EXIM (state 
directed development banks) to join forces with AIIB and follow more transparent standards thus 
providing a clear signal to the West on BRI’s mulilateralization. 	
 	
Institutional Investors as Agents and Builders of Peace Infrastructure and the Pluralism of 
Influence 	
 	
Expected financial benefits for Western institutional investors participating in the BRI 
would inevitably spillover to the realm of economic influence shifting perceptions of the BRI 
across the Eurasian region and bringing concrete geopolitical gains for the West. Pouring in 
substantial amounts of Western savings into what has been so far a project based on Chinese vision 
and money could allay fears of Chinese domination (Shi, 2019). For example, partner financing 
from Western institutional investors would have an instant impact on procurement rules diluting 
the monopoly of Chinese construction and technology firms.  In a way, not only institutional 
investors would be buying early in the creation of vast new vibrant markets, but also they would 
be given the chance to influence the shape and direction of these new markets thus peacefully 
counterbalancing China’s geo-economic sway over recipients of BRI funding [12]. This would offer 
an antidote to what Elizabeth Economy has framed as a key challenge for the West; that is, to ‘deal 
with China’s wherewithal to accept suboptimal economic and efficiency outcomes generated by 
non-market practices in the near-term to try to ensure market dominance in the long-
term’ (Economy, 2018, p. 236).	
In addition, such Western involvement would encourage countries that are currently 
reluctant to participate in BRI projects fearing Chinese economic domination to do so by 
borrowing cheaply from Western institutional investors. The potential for building lasting ties of 
peace across the BRI becomes even bigger by the fact that Western engagement and funding 
would, at least, in the beginning, be welcomed by the PRC leadership. Beijing has declared that 
the BRI is premised on expectations of partnership and is not a geopolitical project to concretize 
PRC’s influence through the creation of captive markets and indebted nations (debt trap). Given 
widespread suspicion of Chinese influence across the Eurasian plateau it is right to assume that 
China would not lose this opportunity to ‘mulilateralize’ the BRI, welcome new partners and 
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demonstrate its openness. As Chinese leaders are acutely aware of the fact that a new Cold War 
could have dire implications for China’s economic development, Beijing would be tempted to join 
forces with Western institutional investors (Zhou, 2019) to implement BRI objectives. After all 
the Chinese president himself declared in 2015 that the BRI will bring ‘a real chorus 
comprising all countries along the route, not a solo for China.’	
 	
Conclusion: The Welfare State Peace Hypothesis and the Limits 
of Economic Interdependence	
 	
Theorizing on how to reconcile staunch geopolitical competitors by fostering economic 
interdependence has long been a pivotal undertaking both in academic and foreign policy circles 
(Gilpin, 2009; Copeland 2014; Mearsheimer 2018). Since the end of the Cold War many scholars 
have asserted that China and the United States are so economically interdependent that a conflict 
between them would lead to ‘Mutual Assured Financial Destruction’ (RAND, 2011). Yet, as the 
father of structural realism Kenneth Waltz had authoritatively put it, ‘interdependence, is more a 
dependent than an independent variable. States, if they can afford to, shy away from becoming 
excessively dependent on goods and resources that may be denied them in crises and 
wars.’ (Waltz, 2000, p.15). 	
It hence comes to no surprise that colossal Chinese investment in the US economy 
including China’s status as the biggest creditor of the federal government has not been enough to 
avert a trade war.  ‘When it seems that we will sink or swim together, swimming separately looks 
attractive to those able to do it” (Waltz, 2000, p. 15). And this is exactly what is happening today 
as Chinese President Xi Jinping have urged Chinese businesswomen to become technologically 
self-sufficient and as the US is looking to ostracize Chinese technology providers from its military 
spply chain and telecommunication infrastructure. As two scholars recently asserted, when 
interdependence is asymmetric it can even become weaponized as some states can ‘leverage 
interdependence to coerce others’. (Farrell and Newman, 2019).	
In this paper we argue, that a joint investment future to alleviate the costs of the Western 
welfare state could soften the sever crisis of interdependence for one pivotal reason: Western 
saver/voter support. The Western middle class would have immediate benefits from a gradual 
transition of pension systems to sustainability without a sharp cut of welfare. While the scheme 
advocated here may not be a panacea it is nonetheless a pragmatic alternative to the nightmarish 
future that is developing before the dazzled eyes of the largely misinformed about trade US 
electorate and thus worth trying. It abides to Hippocratic policy principle and it makes no harm.	
Our argument, which seconds the declaration that ‘Chimerica’ is headed for divorce 
(Ferguson and Schularick, 2011; Trigkas 2015), is that institutions and the current degree of 
economic interdependence do not make conflict between Beijing and Washington prohibitively 
expensive as swimming separately may look attractive. One reason of that is the failure of WTO 
negotiators to curb regulatory arbitrage by the introduction of environmental protection and wage 
and currency safeguards into trade liberalization treaties (Avgouleas 2019a). This has created the 
impression that China and other emerging economies such as Mexico took advantage of 
trade liberalization which resulted in millions of job losses especially in the USA. This is a key 
factor in the de-coupling of the rational incentives of the respective polities that today 
fuels populism in the West and secures the necessary votes for the proponents of trade wars and 
increasing belligerence towards China.	
In our formulation of the ‘Welfare State Dependence Hypothesis’ key Western and Chinese 
constituents acquire powerful incentives for peaceful economic and geo-political co-existence in 
Eurasia. In this formulation we see Western powers as capable to play the role of an equal partner 
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to China by mobilizing their private investment resources. In the epoch of money manager 
capitalism, pouring funds and expertise in the emerging Eurasin economies will make the 
sustainability of the Welfare state in Western republics partly dependent on the success of 
this (non-Chinese) region 20-30 years down the road. Hence our ‘Welfare State Peace 
Hypothesis’ could to some degree bind the long-term societal interests of major powers together in 
a reciprocal manner. If China fosters regulatory predictability and engages institutional investors 
to its market and more importantly across an inclusive and multilateralizedBRI, then 
Beijing’s economic future will be strongly tied to the future of the Western welfare state as a 
flourishing Eurasia would optimize returns for Western pension funds. A 1 per cent increase of 
returns for Western pension funds would decrease contributions by 10% providing vital fiscal 
space and buy political time for sustainable reform of fragile Welfare systems.	
This rational re-alignment of incentives of the Western polities with respect to securing the 
stability of the BRI region and the avoidance of strategic miscalculations that can lead to conflict, 
should be able to act as a strong rebalancing factor in international relations. The Western 
saver/voter who so far has been solely preoccupied with declining real income, due, in her 
perception, to globalization and unfair international trade agreements can this way turn into the 
key supporter of initiatives that bind together the long-term socio-economic goals of the two 
blocs. In addition as experts from the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy have put it: 	
There is nothing inherently wrong about infrastructure investment or 
promoting global connectivity in the developing world. Indeed, the United 
States has an interest in supporting both of these goals. If Washington is 
to form a coherent response to the BRI, it must acknowledge where the 
initiative may align with U.S. interests. (Feng Yujun et al, 2019). 	
 	
These views need to enter into the public debate particularly now that some analysts foresee 
a coming financial war with the US congress potentially banning US pensions funds and money 
managers from investing in assets held by Chinese SOEs. (Howie and Garside, 2019). 	
As we make a case for a liberal yet realistic argument we are not unalloyed optimists. We 
recall Will and Ariel Durant’s 1968 work that in 3,421 years of historical human existence only 
268 years have been without war - a fact captured in Thucydides’ 5th century prophetic declaration 
that his essay was not made to win the applause of the moment but was a possession for all time. 
As strategic communities in both Beijing and Washington calculate their next move and plan for 
5th	generation	 jets,	 conventional	 prompt	 strike	 vehicles,	 autonomous	 weapons,	 quantum	
encryption	 satellites	 and	 swarms offensives, economics – the dismal science 
whose prediction on the pension time bomb are however accurate – may offer some guidance to 
downsize the risk of war be it cool, cold or warm. 	
With institutional investors part and parcel of Eurasia’s future, governments and voters 
(pensioners are among the most committed voters) would not have trouble to see the ‘long shadow 
of the future’, read its contours and realize that the survival of the Western welfare states lies in 
integration rather than disintegration and zero-sum geo-economic antagonism. Swimming 
separately would be less attractive. Perpetual peace may never arise but any Hippocratic policy 
narrative (Miskimmon, O'Loughlin and Roselle, 2017) which is based on realistic foundations 
and fosters creative reform towards interdependence makes no harm[13].	
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the democratic peace: principles for a post-Cold War world, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; for 
a critical appraisal see Ido Oren (1995) ‘The subjectivity of the “democratic” peace: changing US 
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[4] We frame this issue as an issue of realism; for without a viable welfare state, Western societies would 
face a serious social and political crisis which could undermine their global authority. Furthermore if the 
BRI remains a closed project seeking solely to build markets for China to export its overcapacity then it 
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